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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PnocEss-VALIDITY OF REFUSAL TO PERMIT
THE SHOWING OF A MOTION PICTURE ON THE GROUNDS OF OBSCENITY-A

Chicago municipal ordinance made it unlawful to exhibit any motion picture
without first having secured a permit from the Commissioner of Police. The
commissioner is required to issue the permit unless he finds the picture "immoral or obscene. . .."1 On these grounds he refused to permit exhibition of
"The Miracle." Plaintiffs brought suit to have the ordinance declared unconstitutional and to restrain enforcement of the prohibition on the picture.
The trial court granted the relief asked. On appeal, held, reversed and remanded to determine if the motion picture is obscene. A prior restraint on the
exhibition of obscene motion pictures does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in determining whether the picture is obscene, the state has
the burden of showing affirmatively that the dominant effect of the film,
when considered as a whole, is substantially to arouse sexual desires, and that
the probability of this effect outweighs whatever merits the film may possess.

1

Chicago Municipal Code (1939) §155-4.
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American Civil Liberties Union v. Chicago, 3 Ill. (2d) 334, 121 N. E. (2d)
585 (1954), appeal dismissed for want of a final judgment, 75 S. Ct 572
(1955).
It is anomalous but true that only since 1952 have motion pictures been
given protection as a form of speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.2 According to the earlier view, the exhibition of motion pictures was
only a business and not included within the freedoms of speech or press.3 Prior
restraint, as contrasted with subsequent criminal punishment, is the most
offensive type of restriction upon freedom of expression and is the
least likely to be upheld by the courts.4 Yet prior restraint upon obscene
films has the support of dictum in a number of Supreme Court cases.5
In the recent cases involving such prior restraint, the Court has consistently
struck down the restraint. 6 The opinion in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson7
gives three possible attitudes toward licensing of movies: the basis of the restraint is not a legitimate interest of the state;8 the standard of the restraint,
although in a valid area, is too inde6nite;9 the evidence does not show that
the particular motion picture offends a valid standard of decency. 10 There
is support on the Court for still another view-that all prior restraints are
void. 11 Several decisions have struck down licensing provisions held valid
by state courts, but the majority opinions give no particular grounds other
than citing the Burstyn case. 12 Thus, reversal of a New York case upholding

2 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777 (1952), was the first
case to hold that motion pictures were within the protection of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. See also United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 at 166, 68 S.Ct.
915 (1948).
3 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial C_omm., 236 U.S. 230, 35 S.Ct. 387 (1915).
"Justice Holmes is said to have expressed regret, many years afterward, that he ever concurred in this decision and that he did not sense its consequences." CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH
IN THE UNITED STATES 544 (1941). For one of many criticisms of this decision, see 60
YALE L.J. 696 (1951).
4 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 27 S.Ct. 556 (1907); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666
(1938); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S.Ct. 315 (1945); 4 BLACKST. CoMM.,
Hammond ed., 151-152 (1890).
5 Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942); Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948); Near v. Minnesota, note 4 supra.
6 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, note 2 supra; Superior Films v. Dept. of Education,
346 U.S. 587, 74 S.Ct. 286 (1954); Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960, 72 S.Ct. 1002 (1952).
7 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, note 2 supra.
Bid. at 505.
9 Id. at 507 et seq. Concerning the requirement of definite standards for censorship,
see 14 MD. L. REv. 284 (1954).
10 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, note 2 supra, at 506-507.
11 In a concurring opinion in Superior Films v. Dept. of Education, note 6 supra, at
589, Justice Douglas, with Black concurring, took a rigid view: ''In order to sanction a
system of censorship I would have to say that 'no law' does not mean what it says, that
'no law' is qualified to mean 'some' laws. I cannot take that step." Because these justices
concurred on this ground it is fair to say that the basis of the majority opinion must not
have been an absolute ban on censorship.
12 Superior Films v. Dept. of Education, note 6 supra; Gelling v. Texas, note 6 supra.
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a prior restraint because the movie was "immoral" and "tended to immorality,"
construed by the state court to mean only sexual immorality, may mean that
this is not a valid standard by which to prevent the showing of a motion
picture, or it may be that the facts did not show the particular motion picture
to be immoral or tending to immorality.13 Thus, no decision squarely precludes censorship of obscene material.1 4 The principal case presents clearly
the issue of whether or not a state or city may prevent exhibition of a motion
picture because it is obscene. The holding that the ordinance was valid squares
with what indications there are of the Supreme Court's views.
The clear and present danger test, usually applied to restraints upon free
speech, 15 is not applied in the area of censorship for obscenity except as it may
be tacitly assumed by the court that publication or exhibition of obscene material
automatically meets that test.16 If prior restraint upon obscenity is valid at all,
the test does not seem to apply as an additional requirement. The principal
case, by inference, rejects the clear and present danger test for obscene movies
when it states that a movie must be judged as a whole in terms of its effect
on the normal viewer and that its tendency to arouse sexual desires must be
balanced against its merits.
Obscenity has long been considered a definite enough standard for criminal
statutes, 17 more because it is necessary to have some standard than because it
provides a clear, easily workable test 18 The modem test is "whether a publication taken as a whole has a libidinous effect"19 upon the ordinary reader, i.e.,
whether it exploits "dirt for dirt's sake." If it is true that morality is "necessary
13 Superior Films v. Dept. of Education, note 6 supra, involved two appeals, one from
Ohio and one from New York. In the Ohio case a license to exhibit the picture was denied
because the picture was found "harmful." This standard is obviously invalid. In the
New York case a state court denied the license because the movie was inunoral and "would
tend to corrupt morals." The state court had limited immorality to mean sexual inunorality.
The particular ground for the decision is not determinable from the per curiam opinion
reversing the state court.
14 Some cases have held a prior restraint upon obscene materials valid where the
issue was the revocation of the privilege of using the mails, but not where a right of free
expression was restricted. Knowles v. United States, (8th Cir. 1909) 170 F. 409; United
States v. Rebhuhn, (2d Cir. 1940) 109 F. (2d) 512.
15 Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919), dealt with free
expression of political ideas.
16 Antieau, "The Rule of Clear and Present Danger: Scope of Its Applicability," 48
MICH. L. RBv. 811 at 829 et seq. (1950); 1 CHAFEE, GovERNMENT AND MAss CoMMUNICATION 54 (1947).
11 Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 16 S.Ct. 434 (1896); United States v.
Rebhuhn, note 13 supra; New American Library of World Literature v. Allen, (D.C. Ohio
1953) 114 F. Supp. 823; United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," (2d Cir. 1934)
72 F. (2d) 705; Attorney General v. One Book named "Forever Amber," 323 Mass. 302,
81 N.E. (2d) 663 (1948). For a history of the censorship of literature, see Alpert, "Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature," 52 HARV. L. RBv. 40 (1938).
1s CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN nm UNITED STATES 531 (1941); 52 MICH. L. RBv.
575 at 578 (1954).
19 United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," note 17 supra, at 707. See also
United States v. One Obscene Book Entitled "Married Love," (D.C. N.Y. 1931).48 F.
(2d) 821.
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to good government and the happiness of mankind,"20 it is not unreasonable
to say that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens, particularly
its youth, from exhibition of dirt for dirt's sake.21 However, there is always
danger that th~ censor will use the indefiniteness of the standard to prohibit
the expression of ideas repulsive to him personally rather than material inherently obscene. This danger is great enough to convince some writers that
there should be no censorship at all, even for obscenity.22 However, this
danger is met by judicial review of the finding of obscenity, and, as in the
principal case, by placing upon the state the burden of showing obscenity.
Donald F. Oosterhouse, S.Ed.

20 An

Ordinance for the Government of the Northwest Territory, art. III (1787).
argument that subsequent criminal punishment is inadequate ignores the possibility that fear of punishment may operate, in effect, as a stricter prior restraint than
licensing.
22 CHAFEB, Frum SPBBCH m nm UNITED STATBS 547-548 (1941); 42 CALIF. L.
RBv. 122 (1954).
21 The

